{"id":211878,"date":"2026-11-15T14:28:26","date_gmt":"2026-11-15T11:28:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/211878\/"},"modified":"2026-11-15T14:28:28","modified_gmt":"2026-11-15T11:28:28","slug":"belarusian-potash-for-trump-minsk-washington-talks-are-stalling","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/211878\/","title":{"rendered":"Belarusian potash for Trump: Minsk-Washington talks are stalling"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Talks between Belarus and the United States on the release of political prisoners in exchange for sanctions relief, as well as possible economic ties and political engagement, have stalled. Minsk seems to be losing an opportunity to reap substantial political and economic benefits from Donald Trump’s presidency.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n\n Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka and John Coale during their most recent meeting in Minsk in September\n <\/div>\n \n
\n (Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka's press office)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Different interests involved<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Belarusian-American negotiating process, which began after Trump was elected US president, initially appeared groundbreaking, as Minsk sought to reduce its dependence on Russia, which was becoming increasingly unpredictable. Minsk needs an additional counterweight more than ever.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Trump administration initially sought Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka’s help as a \u201cPutin expert\u201d and an additional channel of communication with Moscow. The idea was rather questionable, but US officials publicly acknowledged it. Washington also sought to gauge how much autonomy Belarus had from Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The release of political prisoners in exchange for the lifting of US sanctions became a success story for Trump. News of releases resulting from diplomatic efforts by his Special Envoy John Coale had a positive impact on the US president’s image, as Trump hoped to win the Nobel Peace Prize. He trumpeted the releases of what he called \u201chostages\u201d in Belarus several times on social media.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Belarusian authorities have been trying to align themselves with US foreign policy. \u0141uka\u0161enka was among the first leaders to join Trump’s \u201cBoard of Peace\u201d and declared his intention to meet with the US president.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Potash<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Apart from political prisoners, potash has been the second major subject of the Belarusian-American negotiations. Washington lifted its sanctions on the Belarusian potash giant Bie\u0142aru\u015bkalij and appeared interested in supplies of Belarusian potash to the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Before sanctions were imposed in 2021, Belarus supplied around 500,000 tonnes of fertilizers to the United States. Those shipments were suspended. The United States buys 80\u201390 percent of its potash from Canada, but the Trump administration has been at odds with the Canadian government. This was the main reason for Washington’s interest in Bie\u0142aru\u015bkalij’s products.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On September 21, Trump announced on his Truth Social account that \u201cthe United States is working on a major deal to buy potash fertilizers from Belarus. The price will be significantly lower than what we currently pay Canada \u2014 great news for our farmers and ranchers.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Trump hoped that a potash deal would provide an opportunity to demonstrate success ahead of the November 3 congressional midterm elections. But it hardly made an impact, as the Democrats gained control of both the House and the Senate. Trump’s statement was also intended to weaken Canada’s position in negotiations over new potash supply contracts for the US market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless, considerable uncertainty surrounds a potential potash deal. Belarus is much farther from the United States than Canada, and shipping its potash would inevitably entail higher costs. Therefore, if sold at market prices, Belarusian fertilizers could not be cheaper than Canadian potash on the US market. Moreover, sanctions prevent Minsk from using the nearby port of Klaip\u0117da in Lithuania and ports in Latvia, forcing it to rely on Ust-Luga in Russia’s Leningrad province. This route is longer and more expensive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The United States reportedly proposed that Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine allow Belarusian fertilizers to transit through their ports, but all three countries refused, citing European Union sanctions. These sanctions remain in force until February 28, 2027, after which the EU will decide whether to extend them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Potash shipments to the United States through Baltic ports would represent a major geopolitical victory for \u0141uka\u0161enka’s regime, especially if the EU lifted the restrictions without requiring Minsk to ease repression or end its support for Russia’s war against Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Minsk did send a ship carrying 30,000 tonnes of potash fertilizers to the United States. \u0141uka\u0161enka seems prepared to trade fertilizers with America even at a loss, selling them below market prices in an effort to win Trump’s favor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Attempt to attract American investment<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In 2025, \u0141uka\u0161enka invited US businesses to buy the Nie\u017eynski Mining and Processing Plant for $3 billion. \u0141uka\u0161enka also offered Washington the opportunity to build a nitrogen fertilizer plant in Belarus as part of a joint venture with Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As far as Nie\u017eynski is concerned, he hoped to give fresh impetus to the long-stalled project, improve Belarusian-American relations more broadly and find a US investor who would lobby the US government for more favorable logistics for fertilizer shipments to the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So far, however, the offer has failed to attract American businesses. Pragmatic US investors appear to regard Nie\u017eynski as too risky an asset in a sanctioned and politically toxic country. It remains unclear how much additional investment would be needed to complete the project, how much of its debt would have to be repaid and how business could be conducted amid tensions between Belarus and its neighbors. The latter issue is particularly important because it will determine whether transit routes, including the port of Klaip\u0117da, can be reopened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Furthermore, Belarus has a poor record of respecting foreign investors’ property rights. In 2023, it nationalized Nie\u017eynski after Slavkaliy, a company linked to Russian oligarch Mikhail Gutseriev, failed to deliver on its promises. This is another reason why American investors are unwilling to take the risk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia, a major competitor of Belarus in the potash market, supplies potash to the United States and would not welcome additional competition from its political ally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moscow would also be unhappy if Belarus regained access to the Lithuanian port, as it had spent years trying to divert Belarusian cargo to Russian ports. Minsk resisted because this route was more expensive. Only EU sanctions forced it to switch to the Russian route.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, Russian companies have repeatedly expressed interest in Belarusian potash assets. Russian oligarchs have frequently visited Minsk, and some deals came close to being finalized but fell through at the last moment. If Belarus’s most valuable and strategically important asset were suddenly sold to Americans, it would come as a major shock to the Kremlin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An unsuccessful visit<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

On the surface, the Belarusian-American negotiating process appeared to be progressing well. With each new visit, Coale secured the release of more political prisoners. In March, for example, he secured the release of as many as 250 prisoners as the two sides prepared to strike a \u201cgrand bargain.\u201d Coale said the United States could lift 80 percent of sanctions against Belarus by the end of the year in exchange for the release of all political prisoners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But something went wrong. Negotiations between Minsk and Washington were put on hold for six months. Coale’s September 15\u201316 visit fell short of expectations. Only 25 people were released during the visit, ten times fewer than on the previous occasion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, all 25 people released were taken out of Belarus. By contrast, during Coale’s previous visit in March, only 15 of the 250 released prisoners were expelled from the country. The remaining 235 were allowed to stay in Belarus, marking a concession by \u0141uka\u0161enka.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It appears that both sides were dissatisfied with each other and realized that resolving the key issues would take time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Officials have not commented on the reasons for the impasse. Both Minsk and Washington may have become somewhat disillusioned with each other, possibly because their expectations were too high.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One possible obstacle was the United States’ failure to deliver on promises made during previous rounds of negotiations. After his September visit, Coale essentially acknowledged this in an interview: \u201cNow we need to make sure that banks and companies in the United States understand what the lifting of sanctions means, that it is actually possible to do business in this area. We need to revisit this issue and get some things sorted out.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka apparently expected the United States to pressure Europe into lifting sanctions against Belarus. Europe, however, has refused to compromise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For its part, the United States is disappointed by \u0141uka\u0161enka’s refusal to end repression and release more prisoners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Different levels of interest<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

It appears that the two sides have different levels of interest in deepening the dialogue. Minsk needs a grand bargain far more than Washington does.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After his September visit to Minsk, Coale said he expected to return to the Belarusian capital \u201cin about a month,\u201d hoping to secure the release of \u201chundreds more prisoners.\u201d However, two months have passed, and it remains unclear when that will happen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This uncertainty appears to be causing disappointment, irritation and impatience in Minsk. Trump may lose interest in the negotiations, leaving Minsk’s hopes unfulfilled.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

US interest in Belarusian potash could also wane following the congressional elections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Board of Peace established by Trump has failed to gain traction, while \u0141uka\u0161enka had hoped to meet the US president at a board meeting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition, Coale is expected to be promoted to special envoy for hostage affairs, with the rank of ambassador. Will he have enough time and energy to visit Minsk again?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

All these factors are causing concern for \u0141uka\u0161enka. On October 22, he held a major government conference on Belarusian-American relations to demonstrate to Washington his interest in continuing the dialogue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The conference was attended by Committee for State Security (KGB) Chairman Ivan Tertel and Prosecutor General D\u017amitryj Hora. Both are responsible for the detention and release of political prisoners. Their participation was a signal to Washington that Minsk was ready to discuss further releases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, Belarus is loading a second ship with potash for the United States, despite \u0141uka\u0161enka’s recent claim that all fertilizers had already been contracted and nothing was left for the US market. If the United States needed them so badly, he suggested, it should negotiate with Minsk. Now it turns out that additional potash is available after all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It may have taken the Belarusian ruler too long to strike his \u201cgrand bargain\u201d with the US administration. Now, following the Democrats’ takeover of Congress, Trump’s ability to conduct foreign policy has diminished. For example, he may have less leverage over European allies when it comes to pushing for the lifting of sanctions on Belarus. Instead of a \u201cgrand bargain,\u201d the process could devolve into protracted negotiations over relatively minor concessions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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