{"id":207193,"date":"2026-10-13T13:28:36","date_gmt":"2026-10-13T10:28:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/207193\/"},"modified":"2026-10-13T13:28:38","modified_gmt":"2026-10-13T10:28:38","slug":"russias-war-budget-brings-uncertainty-and-risks-for-belarus","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/207193\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia\u2019s war budget brings uncertainty and risks for Belarus"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The Russian government has presented a new three-year federal budget for 2027\u20132029. Given Belarus\u2019 heavy economic dependence on Russia, the budget is more a source of uncertainty than an opportunity.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n \"\"\n
\n \n
\n (Wikimedia Commons, the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff, the Belarusian leader's website\/ Pozirk's collage)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Dependence on Moscow deepens<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Belarusian economy has always depended on Russia, but this dependence has increased significantly since 2020, particularly after Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022. The Russian market has become even more important for Belarusian producers as access to Western markets has been cut off or restricted, while the eastern route has become a key channel for foreign trade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, dependence extends beyond trade. Russian loans, preferential terms for energy supplies, joint programs and direct transfers to the Belarusian budget are also important. In 2025, non-repayable transfers accounted for more than 10 percent of national budget revenue, and this represented only part of Russia\u2019s support at the macroeconomic level.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a result, the state of the Russian economy now matters to Belarus far beyond demand from its largest trading partner. It affects the workload of Belarusian enterprises, export earnings, the government\u2019s fiscal capacity and access to direct and indirect financial support. It also largely determines Belarus\u2019 ability to develop ties with other foreign markets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Consequently, how many resources Russia will have and how it chooses to allocate them are major economic concerns for Belarusian officials. The new Russian budget should therefore be viewed as an outline of Minsk\u2019s future options.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

War takes priority<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s new budget for 2027\u20132029 looks substantial on paper. Next year, the government expects to collect around 43.3 trillion rubles in revenue and spend 48.7 trillion, leaving a deficit of approximately 5.4 trillion rubles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2028 and 2029, revenue is projected to rise to 45.8 trillion and 48.6 trillion rubles, respectively, while spending is expected to reach 51 trillion and 53.9 trillion. The deficit will persist, exceeding 5 trillion rubles annually.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The budget deficit alone does not yet appear critical for Russia, but the projections seem overly optimistic. This year, the deficit could exceed 7 trillion rubles, compared with the planned 3.8 trillion. This suggests that deficits in subsequent years could also exceed current projections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another problem is that covering the shortfall is becoming increasingly expensive. With access to global capital markets curtailed, the government has had to rely more heavily on domestic borrowing despite high borrowing costs and a limited pool of investors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a result, even a deficit that appears manageable is gradually becoming an additional burden on the budget, leaving less room for other spending.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The structure of Russia\u2019s federal budget reveals the main trend: war is no longer a temporary deviation from fiscal policy but a permanent priority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under the approved 2026 budget, national defense accounts for about 29.3 percent of federal spending. In the draft budget for 2027, that share rises to 35.2 percent. In absolute terms, defense spending increases from 12.9 trillion to 17.1 trillion rubles, or roughly one-third.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, Russia\u2019s budget already acknowledges that there will not be enough funds for everything. The Kremlin will have to borrow more aggressively while tightening its belt in the civilian sector. Many social programs will receive less funding, although this is not being widely publicized.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even the published budget figures should be treated as a rough guide rather than a firm commitment. Experience in recent years has shown how quickly these parameters can change when more resources are needed to sustain the war.<\/p>\n\n\n