{"id":149925,"date":"2025-08-07T11:12:11","date_gmt":"2025-08-07T08:12:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/149925\/"},"modified":"2026-01-05T22:29:46","modified_gmt":"2026-01-05T19:29:46","slug":"belarusian-power-transition-who-will-lead-the-nation-after-lukasenka","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/149925\/","title":{"rendered":"Belarusian power transition: who will lead the nation after \u0141uka\u0161enka?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The departure of Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka will inevitably trigger a transformation of the regime. The likelihood of him successfully installing a hand-picked successor is slim. To gain internal legitimacy, any new ruling team will have to break with his legacy. To maintain power, it will need the approval of both Russia and the Belarusian people and elites.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n (Eugene Shelestov \/ pexels.com)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Ruler not getting younger<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Political analysts have discussed the possibility of a power transition in Belarus\u2014or a designated successor\u2014since the early 2000s. For nearly two decades, thoughtful minds have debated a question that never truly made it onto the political agenda. After all, transitions are only possible when an autocrat intends to step down\u2014and \u0141uka\u0161enka never has.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For the past 30 years, the topic was largely irrelevant. But now, his age and apparent health decline have made it more urgent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The challenge, however, lies in unpredictability. This is an equation with many unknowns.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First and foremost, biological clocks are uncertain. Suppose \u0141uka\u0161enka remains in power for another decade. In today\u2019s rapidly changing world, countless internal and external events could reshape Belarus, rendering any long-term forecast meaningless.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We can only speculate based on current conditions\u2014but ten years from now, today\u2019s assumptions may be obsolete. Still, let us explore some likely scenarios.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In personalist regimes, transitions are crises<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In personalist authoritarian regimes, there is no institutional mechanism for transferring power\u2014not even within the ruling elite, let alone to the opposition. The departure of a dictator often leads to political crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka cannot appoint a successor who would guarantee his safety after leaving office. He simply does not trust anyone\u2014projecting his own history of broken promises onto others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Over the course of his rule, \u0141uka\u0161enka has alienated many, not only within the opposition but also among high-ranking officials, businesspeople and elite circles. That elite carries its own reservoir of grievances. Few things fuel revenge like personal humiliation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Years in power have taught \u0141uka\u0161enka that political guarantees and agreements are conditional at best. Their enforcement depends not on legal norms but on the shifting balance of power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even Chile\u2019s Augusto Pinochet\u2014who built a complex system of legal protections\u2014could not avoid prosecution after stepping down. Modern history is filled with similar examples.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Furthermore, an officially announced successor quickly becomes a threat to the incumbent, serving as a rallying point for disaffected elites. As loyalty shifts, the incumbent becomes a lame duck.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Handing power to a son? Unlikely.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The widely discussed theory that \u0141uka\u0161enka may hand over power to one of his sons is weak for several reasons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First, Belarus is a European country. A hereditary, father-to-son transfer of power would likely be rejected by both the public and the elite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second, while power can be handed down, retaining it without the father\u2019s protection is another matter entirely. That requires political skill\u2014and so far, none of the sons have demonstrated it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka himself has publicly stated that his eldest son, Viktar, lacks his father\u2019s talents and is unfit for leadership. The middle son, D\u017amitryj, is not seen as a serious political figure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2020, Viktar was removed from his post as presidential aide for national security after reportedly opposing violent suppression of protests\u2014a stance suggesting he hopes to remain in Belarus post-\u0141uka\u0161enka.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The youngest son, Mika\u0142aj, is still too young to be considered a national leader.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Third, there\u2019s no evidence that \u0141uka\u0161enka is preparing any of his sons for power. That would require involving them in real governance, promoting them to high-ranking posts and demonstrating their merit to the public\u2014not just their privilege.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What do we see instead? Viktar holds a largely symbolic position as head of the National Olympic Committee. D\u017amitryj remains in the background. Mika\u0142aj is still a student.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why a \u201csuccessor\u201d scenario is doomed<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

More importantly, the \u201csuccessor\u201d scenario is likely to fail for systemic reasons. Any promises made by a successor would only be valid under the current regime. Once the regime changes, those guarantees evaporate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

And a regime change is exactly what \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s departure would bring.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Belarus functions as a personalist regime\u2014a system built around a single, charismatic figure. The entire state apparatus is modeled on, and dependent upon, that one individual.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It functions only through constant personal intervention and ruthless suppression of alternative political actors. In this model, the person at the top is not replaceable. \u0141uka\u0161enka is the keystone. Charisma is not transferrable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As Russian political analyst Dmitry Oreshkin observed: \u201cIf you remove the block called \u2018Batka\u2019 [\u0141uka\u0161enka], the system stops like a watch without a battery.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Removing that keystone will force the regime to evolve.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this light, succession is virtually impossible. \u0141uka\u0161enka is both the architect and the hostage of his own system. He has no choice but to remain in power for life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After dictator\u2014disorder?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

A sudden and unplanned transition would also endanger those in \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s inner circle. Consider the examples of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan: after the deaths of Saparmurat Niyazov and Islam Karimov, their families lost everything. One of Karimov\u2019s daughters was imprisoned; the other lost her fortune.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Complicating matters further, \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s new constitution has changed the structure of power, granting constitutional authority to the All-Belarusian People\u2019s Assembly. While currently symbolic, this could destabilize governance in a post-\u0141uka\u0161enka era.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Today, all decisions are made by one man. Other institutions are essentially frozen. Without him, power struggles could emerge among the presidency, parliament, government, All-Belarusian People\u2019s Assembly, Constitutional Court and Security Council.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In a country lacking stable democratic traditions, such institutional imbalance could result in chaos\u2014much like during Belarus\u2019 1994\u20131996 political crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

De-\u0141uka\u0161enkaization<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Discussions about transition often focus on how \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s entourage might act. The public is largely ignored because under the current regime it lacks the agency to advocate for itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But his exit would radically alter the landscape. The shock of losing a long-standing leader could bring sidelined political forces to the forefront.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unlike North Korea, Azerbaijan or Syria\u2014where dynastic transfers occurred without major public resistance\u2014Belarus experienced the 2020 uprising.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That year revealed a society in flux, seeking change and liberation from state paternalism. The regime clings to the past, while society has outgrown it. Even limited liberalization could catalyze major transformation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Any new leadership will need to undertake a process of de-\u0141uka\u0161enkaization<\/strong> to gain legitimacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The current system is saturated with \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s authoritarian legacy. The pendulum of public sentiment has swung too far\u2014and in politics, as in physics, it must swing back.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Belarus is ready for change, held back by a single man. It echoes the Soviet Union after Josef Stalin\u2019s death.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Stalin\u2019s inner circle understood that legitimacy required de-Stalinization. Leaders like Lavrentiy Beria, Georgy Malenkov and Nikita Khrushchev pursued it instinctively.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Will Russia Dictate Everything?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Russia is widely seen as the decisive external player. Political commentator Siarhiej Navum\u010dyk remarked on Facebook: \u201cThe tragedy of the current situation is that no democratic change is possible in Belarus while [President Vladimir] Putin\u2019s regime governs Russia.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is true that Moscow will likely attempt to shape the power transition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, in small, dependent states, government formation follows a dual legitimacy model. One part comes from the dominant power (Russia); the other must come from the local population and elites.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

During the Soviet era, leaders of satellite states needed both Moscow\u2019s blessing and local support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Edward Gierek in Poland borrowed Western money to raise living standards. J\u00e1nos K\u00e1d\u00e1r in Hungary implemented \u201cgoulash socialism\u201d and earned genuine popularity. Even Nicolae Ceau\u0219escu initially gained support by embracing Romanian nationalism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Belarus, any post-\u0141uka\u0161enka leader will likely seek a similar dual foundation: Russian support and domestic legitimacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Navum\u010dyk argues: \u201cFor a Moscow-appointed leader, public opinion in Belarus will be irrelevant. What matters is the will of the appointer\u2014at least initially.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But I believe the opposite is true. Only \u0141uka\u0161enka, in 2020, could afford to ignore public opinion. He had spent over 25 years building a personalized system, consolidating a loyal state apparatus and cultivating an elite that supported him in the crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A successor will have to rebuild that system from scratch. Even \u0141uka\u0161enka, in his early years (1994\u20131996), had to fight the Supreme Soviet and Constitutional Court to consolidate power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

His successor will also need time to gain a foothold\u2014and without public and elite support, that may be impossible. Depending solely on Moscow is a fragile foundation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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