{"id":139488,"date":"2025-05-23T14:46:43","date_gmt":"2025-05-23T11:46:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/139488\/"},"modified":"2025-05-23T14:46:45","modified_gmt":"2025-05-23T11:46:45","slug":"once-a-pretender-to-throne-now-a-vassal-lukasenkas-fall-from-ambition","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/139488\/","title":{"rendered":"Once a pretender to throne, now a vassal: \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s fall from ambition"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\n\n \"\"\n
\n
\n\n \u0141uka\u0161enka, in an awkward pose, bowed before Putin while receiving the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called in the Kremlin on October 9, 2024\n <\/div>\n \n
\n (\u0141uka\u0161enka's press office's video\/ Pozirk's still)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Collapse of hopes for Russian throne<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Twenty-five years ago, on May 23, 2000, Vladimir Putin visited Belarus for the first time as Russia\u2019s president. This marked the beginning of a new phase in Belarusian-Russian integration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From the outset, the relationship between \u0141uka\u0161enka and Putin was rocky\u2014and for good reason.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Between 1995 and 1999, \u0141uka\u0161enka developed a fervent desire to become the president of a unified Belarusian-Russian state. Taking the Kremlin throne became his id\u00e9e fixe. Belarus\u2019 foreign policy\u2014and to some extent its domestic policy\u2014was significantly shaped by this adventurous and overly ambitious goal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka was prepared to barter: surrender his country\u2019s sovereignty in exchange for the top Kremlin post. Compared to the ailing and unpopular President Boris Yeltsin, the young and charismatic \u0141uka\u0161enka appeared to be a promising leader. His trips across Russian regions resembled an election campaign.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On December 8, 1999, the two signed the treaty to create the Union State of Belarus and Russia. It gave \u0141uka\u0161enka some hope of entering Russia\u2019s presidential race.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But on the last day of 1999, Yeltsin announced his resignation and appointed Putin as acting president. The news came as a shock to the Belarusian leader\u2014it upended all his plans. His prolonged and costly siege of the Kremlin ended in failure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka realized that Putin was here to stay, and the march on Moscow would have to be canceled or postponed\u2014at least for the next four years. He took this blow hard. It is clear why he would harbor resentment toward the man who buried his dream.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These events somewhat cooled his enthusiasm for integration. The original barter\u2014sovereignty for the \u201cMonomakh\u2019s Cap\u201d (a symbol of Russian autocracy)\u2014lost all meaning. It soon became clear that \u0141uka\u0161enka no longer intended to unify the states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moscow takes the reins<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

With Putin\u2019s rise, the policy of Belarusian-Russian integration was significantly revised. First and foremost, the Kremlin decided to take control of the relationship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The union became more genuine in the sense that the political weight of the two countries began to matter. Under Yeltsin, \u0141uka\u0161enka was the main driver of integration. The Kremlin merely reacted weakly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under Putin, Moscow aimed to firmly seize the initiative. If Belarus was a junior partner requiring resources, it had to be controlled and manageable. An uncontrollable satellite was unacceptable. \u0141uka\u0161enka was pushed out of the Russian political arena, and forced to discontinue his noisy tours of Russian regions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another key shift in Putin\u2019s \u201cnew course\u201d was a change from propaganda-driven to pragmatic integration. Putin stated his position clearly: \u201cAny integration project must be viewed strictly in terms of its practical benefits for Russia\u2026 Integration for the sake of appearances, slogans, or the idea of unification itself is not needed.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These policy changes were deeply painful for \u0141uka\u0161enka. His strategy shifted: now the goal of integration was to continue receiving Russian economic and political support while maintaining full freedom of action both domestically and internationally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But Putin was not satisfied. \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s endless rhetoric about integration, without any real movement toward unification, irritated the Russian president.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In July 2002, Putin publicly criticized Belarusian leadership\u2019s stance on integration for the first time. Then, on August 14, after another round of talks with \u0141uka\u0161enka, Putin proposed holding a referendum on Belarus joining Russia \u201cby regions.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this scenario, Belarus wouldn\u2019t even gain the status of Tatarstan or Dagestan\u2014let alone that of a Soviet Republic like the BSSR.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Clearly, this plan was never meant to be implemented. Its real purpose was to dispel the myth, popular in Russia, of \u201c\u0141uka\u0161enka the great Slavic unifier.\u201d \u0141uka\u0161enka repeatedly claimed he was ready to go as far as Russia was\u2014blaming Moscow for the lack of progress. Putin exposed his bluff.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka responded with righteous indignation: \u201cEven Stalin didn\u2019t think of that.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Clash of titans<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Despite his continued claims of being \u201ctrue friends\u201d with Putin, \u0141uka\u0161enka harbored deep resentment. And it repeatedly surfaced.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For instance, on November 23, 2006, after one of many meetings with Putin, \u0141uka\u0161enka told journalists: \u201cHonestly, one of the revelations I\u2019ve had is the extreme dishonesty of leaders at my level.\u201d He even directly accused Putin of deceit in some speeches.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hard to believe today, but in 2007 \u0141uka\u0161enka criticized the personality cult surrounding Putin in Russia. He expressed concern over anti-democratic trends and the Soviet-style governance resurfacing in Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Commenting on a United Russia party congress, \u0141uka\u0161enka told Russian journalists: \u201cI\u2019m very worried that you might, God forbid, slip back into Soviet times. People jumping up and shouting: \u2018Glory to the CPSU! Hooray! Hooray!\u2019 I saw a few moments of that, and my heart sank. That\u2019s what I fear\u2026 That shouldn\u2019t happen.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By summer 2010, several lingering conflicts caused Moscow\u2019s patience to snap, unleashing a full-scale media war against \u0141uka\u0161enka.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The climax was the NTV<\/em> documentary The Godfather<\/em>. Russian writer Alexander Prokhanov remarked that such films typically precede declarations of war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Attempt to play Putin against Medvedev<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

After the famous castling\u2014when Dmitry Medvedev became president and Putin took over as prime minister\u2014\u0141uka\u0161enka hatched a risky plan to pit the two Russian leaders against each other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He frequently pushed the idea of the \u201cbad premier\u201d and \u201cgood president.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka himself candidly described his attempt: \u201cWhen Medvedev became president, I said to him: \u2018Listen, Dmitry Anatolyevich, you\u2019re new\u2014let\u2019s give our relations a fresh impetus. People should see progress. You\u2019ve got to build your legacy. Let\u2019s review our relationship at the Supreme State Council [of the Union State]. Let the Russian prime minister report to us on what\u2019s worked and what hasn\u2019t.\u2019 He agreed. I sent the agenda\u2026 But the response was: \u2018Don\u2019t even think about it. Our prime minister will not report.\u2019 And that was the end of it.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The latest period of tension in Belarusian-Russian relations lasted from December 2018 to August 2020 after Moscow declared it would only continue subsidizing Belarus if Minsk agreed to deeper integration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For the first time, Russia used economic blackmail so openly to push Belarus toward unification.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Belarusian government was forced to seek alternative oil supplies\u2014even buying from the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Trading sovereignty for political support<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The 2020 mass protests in Belarus profoundly affected its relationship with Russia. \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s regime became visibly weaker and more reliant on Russian support\u2014vulnerable and under pressure from Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of harsh sanctions, Belarus’ economic dependence on Russia became a matter of survival. Two-thirds of its foreign trade is now with its main ally. Almost all export logistics have shifted to Russian ports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Domestically, \u0141uka\u0161enka still enjoys nearly complete control but has little room for maneuver in foreign policy, especially in military matters, with his actions constrained by Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia sees Belarus as a military foothold in its confrontation with NATO. That\u2019s how Europe views Belarus too\u2014dramatically limiting its sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ideological and media policies have been aligned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Amid global instability, the survival instinct has pushed Minsk and Moscow closer together.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At a psychological level, \u0141uka\u0161enka has tied his fate to Putin\u2019s. He now sees Belarus and Russia, himself and the Russian president, as one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Their personal union has transformed into a tight interstate alliance\u2014like a medieval pact between rulers. Negotiations are often secret. Even parliaments and governments are left out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After the Wagner Group mutiny in June 2023, \u0141uka\u0161enka explained this interdependence: \u201cIf Russia falls, we\u2019ll be crushed under the rubble\u2026 This chaos would immediately spill over to Belarus.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In other words, he agreed with what independent analysts have long argued: the survival of his regime depends entirely on Putin\u2019s support. If Putin falls, so does \u0141uka\u0161enka.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Perhaps the most symbolic image of Belarus\u2019s dependence on Russia came last year\u2014when \u0141uka\u0161enka, in an awkward pose, bowed before Putin while receiving the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called. A fitting illustration of today\u2019s relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n
\n \"\"