{"id":131360,"date":"2025-03-24T17:07:20","date_gmt":"2025-03-24T14:07:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/131360\/"},"modified":"2026-04-15T13:35:32","modified_gmt":"2026-04-15T13:35:32","slug":"oreshnik-hype-seen-as-russias-scare-tactic","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/131360\/","title":{"rendered":"Oreshnik hype seen as Russia\u2019s scare tactic"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The story of the deployment of Russian President Vladimir Putin\u2019s wonder weapon\u2014the Oreshnik missile system\u2014in Belarus is full of contradictions. It may simply be a bluff or a scare tactic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n\n The triple warhead of the Pioneer missile system, a prototype of Oreshnik. Kapustin Yar missile testing range, Znamensk, Russia. \n <\/div>\n \n
\n (Leonidl \/ Wikimedia Commons)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s promise fades into delay<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

On January 26, following his controversial re-election, Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka claimed that Russia would deploy Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Belarus \u201cany day now.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, on March 14, while speaking at the Russian Federation Council, \u0141uka\u0161enka revised his statement, saying that several systems would be transferred from Moscow to Belarus before the end of the year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, \u201cany day now\u201d seems to have been just hot air intended to intimidate adversaries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Putin, on the other hand, said in Minsk on December 6 that missiles might be stationed in Belarus in the second half of 2025, after Russia expands missile production and supplies Oreshnik systems to the Russian Strategic Missile Forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conflicting statements<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

At the Eurasian Economic Union summit on December 26, \u0141uka\u0161enka suggested that Russia should station ten Oreshnik systems in Belarus. Putin responded that ten was too many.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A month later, \u0141uka\u0161enka claimed that his statement about ten missile systems had been a joke. \u201cIt would take Russia two to three years to produce them. It\u2019s complex weaponry. One would be enough to defend Belarus.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Two to three years is still an optimistic estimate. \u0141uka\u0161enka waited 15 years for Iskander missiles. Russia may not have started mass production of Oreshnik yet\u2014Putin might simply be bluffing. Moreover, Moscow is unlikely to prioritize Belarus as the number one location for its state-of-the-art systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Additionally, Putin made it clear that the Oreshnik, if stationed in Belarus, would be part of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces. He also noted that Minsk would be able to select targets, which would be enough for Belarus to become a potential target for a retaliatory strike.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Range<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Putin mentioned that engineers have yet to fix the Oreshnik\u2019s minimum range.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The BelPol intelligence group noted that the Oreshnik has a range of 1,000 to 5,500 kilometers. While engineers may slightly reduce the minimum range, the missile can hardly be modified to hit targets located less than 500 kilometers away.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

BelPol mocked \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s propagandists, who claimed the Oreshnik missile could travel from Brest to Vilnius in a matter of minutes. Based in Belarus, the Oreshnik would not be able to strike targets in Poland, Lithuania or Latvia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, if these systems are stationed in Brest or anywhere near NATO territory, they could easily be destroyed using standard 155-mm artillery systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

No wonder \u0141uka\u0161enka noted on January 26 that he would prefer to place the Oreshnik \u201cnext to Smolensk\u201d because \u201ca certain distance is needed.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Russians could just as well place the weapon in western Smolensk province, from where it could strike any point in Europe. Several dozen kilometers simply do not matter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In fact, there is no real military necessity to bring these missiles to Belarus. BelPol dismissed officials’ statements about Belarusian deployment as part of the Kremlin\u2019s misinformation campaign. The likely intent is to create uncertainty, unpredictability and anxiety by discussing the placement of wonder weapons closer to NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Belarus\u2019 role<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

On March 13, \u0141uka\u0161enka said that the Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant (MZKT) would soon begin producing transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicles for the Oreshnik, adding that all he needs “from the big brother” is the missile itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He clearly exaggerated MZKT\u2019s role.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Security Council State Secretary Alaksandar Valfovi\u010d was more specific, explaining that the Belarusian company manufactures only the chassis, while Russia installs the erector, launcher and missile.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Belarusian military analyst Alaksandar Alesin suggested that the MZKT-79292 chassis are suitable for the Oreshnik, while BelPol and other sources said that the missiles are mounted on the MZKT-79291.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n (Max Fisher \/ YouTube; still \/ Pozirk)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Experts believe the Oreshnik missile has been developed by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology by improving the design of the Soviet Pioner land-based mobile missile system. During the Cold War, more than half of the Soviet Union\u2019s Pioner missiles were deployed in the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic. These missiles could be launched either from silos or mobile systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka claimed that all silos have been kept intact, but BelPol doubts the veracity of this statement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka and Putin\u2019s missile theater<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The noise surrounding the Oreshnik appears to be a bluff. Many experts suspect that it is simply a slightly upgraded old Soviet weapon, with capabilities exaggerated by officials to intimidate adversaries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The interests of the two autocrats align perfectly in this sense. Putin, with his global ambitions, uses the Oreshnik and nuclear weapons to blackmail Ukraine and the West, attempting to impose his conditions and reshape the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka fears that NATO might help his opponents overthrow his regime. He uses the wonder weapon, just like the alleged Russian tactical nuclear weapons stored in Belarus, to scare off enemies and strengthen his position. At the same time, he plays a secondary role in Russia\u2019s influence operation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the end, the Oreshnik may never be deployed in Belarus. BelPol said that it has found no evidence to prove the presence of tactical nuclear munitions in the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dnipro test<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

A new Russian missile struck Dnipro, Ukraine, on November 21, 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ukrainian military intelligence maintains that the missile is a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile known as Kedr (cedar). They say it was travelling at Mach 11 and took 15 minutes to arrive from the launch site, more than 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) away in the Astrakhan region of Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

They said the missile was equipped with six warheads, each with six sub-munitions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Putin said that the weapon travelled at a speed of Mach 10, or 2.5-3km per second (10 times the speed of sound), adding that “there are currently no ways of counteracting this weapon.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If Putin’s description is correct, the missile is at the upper edge of the definition of hypersonic, and few things can achieve this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Speed is important because the faster a missile travels, the quicker it gets to target. The quicker it gets to target, the less time a defending military has to react.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A ballistic missile generally gets to target by following an arcing path up into the atmosphere and a similar one down towards its destination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But as it descends, it picks up speed and gains kinetic energy, and more kinetic energy gives it more options. This allows it to maneuver down towards the target – by performing some kind of defending wriggle – that makes interception by surface-to-air missile systems particularly difficult.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is not new for militaries that have to defend against such threats of course, but the greater the speed, the harder it becomes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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