{"id":127727,"date":"2025-02-25T18:45:08","date_gmt":"2025-02-25T15:45:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/127727\/"},"modified":"2026-04-15T13:35:32","modified_gmt":"2026-04-15T13:35:32","slug":"us-lukasenka-bargain-to-benefit-russia-frustrate-exiled-opposition","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/127727\/","title":{"rendered":"US-\u0141uka\u0161enka bargain to benefit Russia, frustrate exiled opposition"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

If the US and Russian leaders reach a deal to improve relations, Belarusian companies could face strong competition as American and European firms return to Russia, Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka warned during a tour of the Minsk region on February 21.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n\n \u0141uka\u0161enka and Putin on Valaam in 2024\n <\/div>\n \n
\n (The Kremlin's website)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka navigates uncertainty in US-Russia negotiations<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Commenting on the ongoing negotiations, \u0141uka\u0161enka acknowledged the uncertainty: “We do not know what the United States wants . . . or what they will demand from the Russians to end the war.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It seems unlikely that the Kremlin is sharing detailed information about its talks with the United States with \u0141uka\u0161enka, though he likely reports his own dealings with the Americans to Moscow. Russian President Vladimir Putin is probably aware of US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Smith\u2019s recent trip to Minsk, his meetings with \u0141uka\u0161enka and the head of the Committee for State Security (KGB), as well as the release of three Belarusian political prisoners and a New York Times<\/em> article about a possible “grand bargain” involving the release of a significant number of political prisoners in exchange for Washington easing its sanctions on Belarus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Opposition commentators argue that the release of political prisoners requires the Kremlin’s approval, as \u0141uka\u0161enka, a vassal of Russia, cannot make this decision independently. However, the decision-making process may be more complex. While the Kremlin tightly controls Minsk\u2019s foreign policy, \u0141uka\u0161enka does retain some autonomy on domestic issues. Since July, he has pardoned more than 250 political prisoners. If this process were against Moscow’s interests, Russia would have blocked it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is unclear whether Russia would truly benefit from the lifting of Belarusian sanctions. The New York Times<\/em> points out that Moscow has profited from the Belarusian potash embargo by selling its own fertilizers at higher prices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In its analysis, the Institute for the Study of War notes that lifting sanctions on Belarus would strengthen Russia\u2019s military efforts, as Russia uses Belarus to circumvent sanctions, with the economies of both countries closely intertwined.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Minsk has also learned to exploit the gaps between sanctions on Russia and Belarus, engaging in gray-market schemes and illegal imports, which may be leveraged in negotiations with Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Both Belarusian and Russian officials likely follow a similar tactic in their dialogue with the West: extracting concessions while failing to fulfill their promises. From this perspective, \u0141uka\u0161enka has operated within the framework set by the Kremlin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Debate over \u0141uka\u0161enka-US bargain<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Opponents of the proposed bargain argue that it would primarily benefit \u0141uka\u0161enka. While he may release some prisoners, he would imprison others in their place. Meanwhile, political reprisals continue unabated: on February 21, the trial of journalist Ihar Ilja\u0161 opened in Minsk. His wife, Kaciaryna Andrejeva, is serving an 8-year sentence for her journalistic work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to The New York Times<\/em>, \u0141uka\u0161enka allegedly told Smith that he was ready to ease repression. However, the term “easing” is vague, and while it may be an improvement over intensifying repression, the real question is how to ensure that \u0141uka\u0161enka follows through on any promises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Exiled politicians clash over sanctions and prisoner release demands<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Smith’s visit to Minsk caught Belarusian political \u00e9migr\u00e9s by surprise. Veteran opposition politician Zianon Pa\u017aniak has advocated for concessions to \u0141uka\u0161enka in exchange for the release of prisoners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On February 19, the United Transitional Cabinet (UTC) outlined its conditions: reprisals must end, all prisoners must be released, convictions overturned, independent media decriminalized, and the rule of law restored. Only after these conditions are met should part of the sanctions be lifted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In effect, the UTC is demanding that \u0141uka\u0161enka dismantle the pillars of his regime. Since 2020, he has maintained power through repression, and his security forces are likely to press him to continue persecuting opponents. He may release some prisoners, but only if they agree to leave the country. Overturning convictions would mean acknowledging the criminal nature of the repressive system\u2014something that would require prosecuting the judges responsible for these injustices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regarding independent media, the regime has silenced all critical outlets following the 2020 presidential election, viewing any media that challenges its narrative as a threat to stability. Exposing the country to what the regime considers subversive media is unacceptable to the authorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The UTC\u2019s position appears to be maximalist, rigid and disconnected from the current reality, unless it serves the role of a “bad cop” in negotiations. The author is unaware of any behind-the-scenes talks between pro-democracy forces and Western actors such as Smith. The actual subject of these negotiations may differ from public expectations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Step-by-step approach key to political change in Belarus<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka is unlikely to offer significant concessions to the West or his opponents in exchange for minor sanctions relief. A more promising approach might be a step-by-step process: the release of some political prisoners, including prominent figures, with reciprocal gestures, such as the return of the US ambassador to Minsk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, it is unclear how far this process could go if it even begins. Most analysts remain skeptical. Still, it would be unwise to miss any potential opportunity, and a step-by-step approach could at least slow the regime’s repressive machine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Long-term predictions are difficult, particularly in light of US President Donald Trump\u2019s unpredictable policies. If negotiations with the Kremlin fail, Trump might quickly shift focus to other matters. However, Putin holds most of the cards, and if talks collapse, the war against Ukraine is likely to continue until Kyiv\u2019s resistance falters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Belarus\u2019 pro-democracy forces, the focus should be on securing the release of as many political prisoners as possible, without harboring illusions about the possibility of reshaping the regime. \u0141uka\u0161enka, of course, is not inclined to negotiate with exiled politicians, but pressure from Western partners could force him to engage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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