{"id":120660,"date":"2025-01-04T17:50:05","date_gmt":"2025-01-04T14:50:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/120660\/"},"modified":"2025-01-28T13:30:36","modified_gmt":"2025-01-28T10:30:36","slug":"lukasenka-aims-for-western-engagement-not-formal-recognition","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/120660\/","title":{"rendered":"\u0141uka\u0161enka aims for Western engagement, not formal recognition"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The January 21-26 presidential election will usher in a new political cycle in Belarus. What follows will largely depend on potential peace talks over Ukraine, the West\u2019s willingness to engage with Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka and the Kremlin\u2019s political strategy towards Belarus.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n (\u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s press office)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

On the evening of January 26, the Central Election Commission will declare Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka the winner. While this declaration will mark the beginning of a new political cycle, it will not bring about any fundamental change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The year 2025 is expected to see developments that could impact Eastern Europe, including the inauguration of US President Donald Trump on January 20. The war in Ukraine may be nearing its resolution, either becoming a frozen conflict or leading to a long-term ceasefire with international guarantees to be negotiated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Russian economy, struggling under pressure, significantly affects Belarus. Experts predict higher inflation, a crisis in the military industry and adverse effects from the high key interest rate set by the Russian Central Bank. These factors add to the uncertainty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Minsk aims for engagement, not political legitimacy<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Some analysts believe that \u0141uka\u0161enka will attempt to restore his legitimacy in the eyes of the West through the election. By announcing a win with 80-90 percent of the vote\u2014uncontested by protests\u2014he may attempt to frame the 2020 political crisis as a misunderstanding to be forgotten.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under this pretext, Minsk seeks to participate in potential peace talks between Russia and Ukraine. \u0141uka\u0161enka expects Western politicians to turn the page, forgetting past disagreements and rebuilding relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, returning to the state of affairs in 2019 is nearly impossible. Undoing the 2020 election fraud, police violence and justifying mass repression and Belarus’ involvement in the war against Ukraine are daunting tasks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Western countries and international organizations have already stated that the election in Belarus should not be recognized due to its farcical nature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It seems that officials in Minsk are aware of this and are seeking a different kind of legitimacy\u2014one that is practical, rather than political.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The West had no doubts that the 2024 election in Russia was a special operation designed to extend Vladimir Putin\u2019s powers. Before the invasion of Ukraine, the EU and the US engaged with the Kremlin. After the war began, many ties were severed, but contacts remained: Western ambassadors work in Moscow, and politicians occasionally call Putin, recognizing him as president.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A similar approach is taken with Azerbaijan. Since 2003, the country has been ruled by Ilham Aliyev, who inherited power from his father. There is no political pluralism, and in the 2024 election, Aliyev claimed to have won 92 percent of the vote. The West criticized the election but, overall, accepted it and continued to cooperate with Azerbaijan, rather than treating it as a pariah.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka seeks to be treated like Aliyev. He is not looking for formal recognition as president but instead is eager to restore practical ties. Minsk is ready to accept criticism if ambassadors return and cooperation resumes, even under sanctions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the chances of extracting practical concessions from the West are objectively low. The regime’s extreme unpopularity, toxicity, and dependence on the Kremlin make Belarus a problematic partner for meaningful relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka uses prisoner release as a bait<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Theoretically, some Western countries may consider concessions to Belarus, especially in the context of Ukraine. Even if \u0141uka\u0161enka is not invited to peace talks, a ceasefire could prompt the West to reconsider its approach to Belarus. Rather than pressing for regime change, the focus may shift to the release of political prisoners and persuading Minsk to ease repression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The release of political prisoners seems like a realistic goal. For \u0141uka\u0161enka, prisoners have always been a bargaining chip, and recent pardons over the past six months show his readiness to negotiate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, his overtures have been ignored by the West, as long as reprisals continue unabated. \u0141uka\u0161enka is convinced that the 2020 crackdown helped him hold onto power. His logic is simple: any reduction in the level of intimidation could fuel anti-government sentiment, opposition activity, and increase threats from “extremists.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Therefore, easing repression is unacceptable to the regime, and concessions from the West are unlikely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since the tumultuous 2020 presidential election, \u0141uka\u0161enka has made no concessions to his critics and has not attempted to reduce political polarization. By responding to criticism with violence, he has only fueled antagonism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The upcoming election is unlikely to change this strategy. At best, the authorities may try to conceal reprisals. For instance, police may stop posting confession videos, but this would not signal a change in the overall repressive policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recent examples of persecution are telling: D\u017amitryj Ku\u010duk, leader of the dissolved Greens Party, was sentenced to six years in prison. Mika\u0142aj Chi\u0142a, an EU delegation staff member, is on trial and faces a lengthy prison sentence. Minsk has ignored the EU’s appeal for his release.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In recent months, authorities have arrested a number of foreigners on charges of espionage. Prominent political prisoners remain incommunicado for over a year, being pressured to publicly repent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka’s Moscow ties block Western engagement<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Minsk’s critical dependence on Moscow is the main obstacle to warming relations with the West. \u0141uka\u0161enka has little room to maneuver, and his role in international politics has diminished.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The January 26 election will not reduce his dependence on Russia. However, a ceasefire in Ukraine could expose him to new risks. If Russian President Vladimir Putin fails to achieve his primary goal of installing a pro-Moscow government in Ukraine, the Kremlin may increase pressure on Minsk to unify Belarus with Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Otherwise, 2025 is unlikely to bring any big changes for Belarus. The West sees little point in negotiating with \u0141uka\u0161enka as long as key decisions are made in Moscow. If he remains dependent, Minsk\u2019s ties with the West will remain frozen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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