{"id":118614,"date":"2024-12-17T14:19:47","date_gmt":"2024-12-17T11:19:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/118614\/"},"modified":"2026-04-15T13:35:32","modified_gmt":"2026-04-15T13:35:32","slug":"oreshnik-bluff-belarus-role-in-putins-strategic-game-against-west","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/118614\/","title":{"rendered":"Oreshnik bluff: Belarus\u2019 role in Putin\u2019s strategic game against West"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Belarusian officials and propaganda officers have expressed enthusiasm about Russia\u2019s potential deployment of Oreshnik missile systems in Belarus, claiming it would deter Western adversaries from attacking the country.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n\n Belarusian wheels for Russian nukes: Topol-M missile system fitted with MZKT-79221 chassis\n <\/div>\n \n
\n (Goodvint \/ ru.wikipedia.org)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Major influence operation<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The PR campaign in support of the Oreshnik deployment appears to be orchestrated by the authorities. A\u0142a Smalak, head of the Homiel branch of the Belarusian Red Cross, argued that it is necessary to counterbalance American Tomahawk missiles. Political analyst Vadzim Ja\u0142fima\u016d described the new weapon as a “NATO gravedigger,” suggesting it could potentially “nullify the alliance,” even during peacetime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Propagandists in Belarus speak of Oreshnik deployment as a fait accompli, citing statements from Vladimir Putin. On December 6, the Russian president announced that the system would be deployed next year, after Russia begins mass production and supplies it to Russian troops.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Putin’s statements are part of the Kremlin\u2019s broader influence campaign aimed at the West. On December 7, Siarhiej \u0141ahadziuk, deputy chief of the Belarusian General Staff, said that the decision to deploy the Oreshnik was made in response to the United States and Germany deploying medium-range missiles in Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On December 10, Alyaksandr \u0141uka\u0161enka echoed him, claiming that Belarus was responding to threats from the West and that a retaliatory action was necessary. However, \u0141uka\u0161enka acknowledged that the Oreshnik deployment could be a hard sell in the run-up to the January 21-26 presidential election.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Chatham House poll conducted last year found that 75% of Belarusians opposed the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus. A similar level of opposition can be expected for the Oreshnik, which can carry nuclear warheads.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

State media in Belarus have touted the nuclear version of the Oreshnik as being equivalent to 45 nuclear bombs, like those dropped on Hiroshima. However, Belarus could face equally devastating or even greater destruction in the event of a retaliatory strike.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Deployments as sign of Moscow’s clout over Belarus<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The threats to station the Oreshnik in Belarus are a clear signal to Berlin and Washington to reconsider their plans to deploy new missiles in Germany by 2026. The Kremlin may be hoping that Donald Trump will reverse the decision when he returns to office.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Minsk\u2019s role in these decisions is largely to follow orders from Moscow. Officials staged a performance at the Supreme State Council meeting, where \u0141uka\u0161enka requested the Oreshnik, and Putin graciously agreed. However, it is clear that such decisions are discussed in advance behind closed doors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka is playing into Putin\u2019s hands, even though he realizes that this move is unpopular with Belarusians. He appears to genuinely believe in the threats posed by NATO, Polish territorial claims and other dangers actively manufactured by him and his propaganda staff.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka’s Oreshnik bluff masks Russian strategy<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka has instructed officials to determine military objectives for the Oreshnik as soon as it is deployed in Belarus. While visiting Barysa\u016d last week, \u0141uka\u0161enka mentioned that the Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant (MZKT) builds the transporter-erector-launcher vehicles for the Oreshnik.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Experts speculate that the Oreshnik could be a modified version of the RS-26 Rubezh missile system or a shorter variant of the Yars-M system. As such, it is likely to be mounted on the MZKT-79291 or MZKT-79292 chassis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Belarus has retained some infrastructure from the Soviet nuclear arsenal, including shelters for Pioner intermediate-range missiles. Experts speculate that these shelters could be upgraded to house the Oreshnik.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka claimed Belarus has about 30 suitable sites. In Barysa\u016d, he also suggested that Belarus could produce the launchers domestically, with Russia providing the missiles for free.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This statement creates the illusion that the Oreshnik would be at the disposal of the Belarusian Armed Forces. In reality, however, the situation is different. At the Supreme State Council meeting, Putin emphasized that the choice of targets for the Oreshnik would remain under Belarusian control. However, he also noted that the system would remain under the control of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, meaning Moscow would maintain ultimate authority over its deployment and use.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The deployment of the Oreshnik would therefore increase Russia\u2019s military presence in Belarus through the establishment of new bases, effectively limiting \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s autonomy and the country\u2019s independence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka plays madman to unsettle West<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Putin\u2019s rhetoric about \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s role in requesting and deploying the Oreshnik is a staged influence operation, similar to the claims of Russian tactical nuclear weapons being in Belarus. Shortly after an opposition group questioned the validity of these claims, \u0141uka\u0161enka declared that he had brought dozens of nuclear warheads into the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThey say this is a joke, but they missed it. They didn\u2019t even see how we brought them here,\u201d \u0141uka\u0161enka told factory workers in Barysa\u016d, as quoted by state media. Remarkably, when \u0141uka\u0161enka presents himself as the master of nuclear weapons or Oreshniks, Moscow does not challenge his claims.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In a 2023 interview with Olga Skabeyeva, \u0141uka\u0161enka boasted, \u201cLet our enemies tremble. . . They say, \u2018Well, you know who \u0141uka\u0161enka is. . .\u2019 That\u2019s right. That\u2019s what I am when it comes to my people, when it comes to my state.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moscow’s objective is to create uncertainty. It does not matter whether \u0141uka\u0161enka has access to the “red button” or not; the mere suggestion is enough to keep Western politicians on edge. The BelPol association of former law enforcement officers reported last month that it had found no evidence of nuclear weapons in Belarus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even though Belarus possesses Iskander tactical missile systems, it does not automatically mean the country has nuclear warheads for these systems. These weapons are produced in small quantities, and their presence in Belarus has not been confirmed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pavel Podvig, a researcher at the UN Institute for Disarmament Studies, made a similar statement. Like the presence of tactical nuclear weapons, the deployment of the Oreshnik may never materialize, despite announcements from Moscow and Minsk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Such statements are consistent with Putin\u2019s strategy, which often relies on threats and disinformation. \u0141uka\u0161enka actively participates in this game, playing a role in sowing doubt and uncertainty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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