{"id":115454,"date":"2024-11-26T15:21:04","date_gmt":"2024-11-26T12:21:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/115454\/"},"modified":"2024-11-26T15:21:06","modified_gmt":"2024-11-26T12:21:06","slug":"lukasenka-braces-for-power-struggles-amid-war-and-isolation","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/115454\/","title":{"rendered":"\u0141uka\u0161enka braces for power struggles amid war and isolation"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In January 2025, the Belarusian government will conduct a \u201cspecial operation\u201d to re-elect Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka to the top office. However, significant challenges are likely to follow.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n \"\"\n
\n \n
\n (Samer Daboul \/ pexels.com)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The election is scheduled for January 21-26 and will take place under tight security and amid widespread international condemnation. The Belarusian public remains heavily repressed, so protests are unlikely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The election occurs against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Ukraine, Belarus’ international isolation, and the presence of a strong opposition abroad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The outcome of the war is still uncertain. Leaving aside the unlikely scenarios of a humiliating Russian defeat or a resounding victory, two more plausible outcomes remain: the Kremlin\u2019s success or its potential weakening. Both scenarios carry risks for the Belarusian regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kremlin\u2019s success<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this scenario, if Russia were to gain international recognition for Crimea and other captured territories, Moscow would demand even greater loyalty from Belarus, potentially limiting its autonomy.
The Kremlin would likely push ahead with plans for a single currency, a unified parliament and a single head of state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Disappointed by Russia\u2019s success, the West would tighten sanctions on Belarus, further isolating the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, the Kremlin might press for a power transfer from \u0141uka\u0161enka to a more compliant official. Even if such a transfer were postponed until 2035, \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s real power would diminish significantly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kremlin\u2019s weakening<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this scenario, Russia would withdraw its troops from Ukraine\u2019s occupied territories, leaving Crimea under Russian control until a diplomatic resolution is reached.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Facing an economic crisis and sociopolitical unrest, Russia would likely scale back its economic support for Belarus, weakening the pro-Russian faction within the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This could pave the way for the rise of technocrats and nationalists who are interested in normalizing relations with the West and ending the current repression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

How \u0141uka\u0161enka would react in such circumstances remains unclear. Until 2020, he had balanced relations between Russia and the West through his so-called \u201cmulti-vector\u201d policy. After 2020, however, he severed ties with the West and aligned Belarus firmly with Russia, upsetting the balance between technocrats and security officers and straining relations with the public.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A return to the pre-2020 status quo seems impossible. As a result, \u0141uka\u0161enka would face a difficult decision: whether to intensify repression and deepen Belarus’ isolation or to make concessions to technocrats and pro-democracy groups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Both options carry significant risks, and it is unclear which would be more dangerous to his rule.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Economic strains<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka frequently claims that Belarus’s future depends on its economy, asserting that a healthy economy can resolve many of the country\u2019s problems, including the prevention of war. He came to power in 1994 during an economic crisis and takes pride in leading the nation away from the \u201cabyss.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From January to October this year, Belarus’s GDP grew by 4.2%. \u0141uka\u0161enka is sure to highlight this economic record during his re-election campaign.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, independent experts warn that the economy is overheating, with demand outstripping supply. Manufacturers are operating at full capacity, and labor shortages are worsening. There is a real risk of a sharp economic downturn, as GDP growth has already begun to slow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Key sectors of the Belarusian economy continue to suffer from sanctions. According to a November report from the Polish Center for Eastern Studies, the potash industry is in serious trouble. Exports to the EU and India are declining, and Belarus is forced to sell goods to China at lower prices. Exporting goods through Russian ports also increases costs and deepens Belarus’ dependence on Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The government\u2019s draft budget for 2025 includes a 30-percent increase in defense spending and a 14-percent increase for the law enforcement agencies, while social spending is set to be reduced.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This includes cuts to family assistance, which will be reduced by more than 20 million rubles.
The intimidated public is unlikely to protest the social spending cuts, but growing discontent may eventually boil over. Even after his show election in 2025, the \u0141uka\u0161enka government will likely continue operating in survival mode.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n
\n \"\"