{"id":110790,"date":"2024-10-23T15:15:30","date_gmt":"2024-10-23T12:15:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/110790\/"},"modified":"2024-10-23T15:15:32","modified_gmt":"2024-10-23T12:15:32","slug":"lukasenkas-departure-not-a-game-changer-for-democracy","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/110790\/","title":{"rendered":"\u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s departure: not a game changer for democracy"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Aliaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s departure does not guarantee democratization, but it is likely to result in immediate changes to the government system, moving away from the \u0141uka\u0161enka-centric model that has dominated since 1996.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n (Samer Daboul \/ pexels.com)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

In early September, Radyjo Svaboda<\/em> conducted a poll of experts regarding Belarus\u2019s future. Most indicated that a change in government would only be possible after \u0141uka\u0161enka’s death. This article also explores other potential scenarios, such as retirement or resignation, with \u0141uka\u0161enka maintaining control as chairman of the All-Belarusian People\u2019s Assembly or secretary of the Security Council.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Death<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The passing of rulers often leaves intact the resilient authoritarian systems they have created and reinforced, contend<\/a> Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz in an essay. The political scientists noted that in 92 percent of 79 cases of rulers’ deaths\u2014including those of Josef Stalin in 1953, Mao Zedong in 1976, and Kim Il Sung in 1994\u2014the authoritarian regimes survived.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

More recent examples include Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Fidel Castro in Cuba, and Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan. Moreover, an autocrat\u2019s death can even strengthen the regime, as propaganda can exploit cultural traditions of respect for the deceased. Governments typically hold grand funerals, declare days of mourning and foster an atmosphere of sorrow and respect, making it difficult for opponents to mobilize. This gives the ruling elite time to adjust their mechanisms for retaining power and to legitimize themselves as successors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s hypothetical death would test the system, given its high dependence on his personal charisma and the lack of institutional mechanisms for policy-making. However, power would not be readily available. The critical question is whether his supporters could maintain control without significant changes. They might have to choose between total submission to the Kremlin or negotiating a compromise with domestic opponents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Retirement<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Retirement at \u0141uka\u0161enka’s own volition seems highly unlikely. It could occur only if he becomes unfit for the role due to health issues. The ruling elite would then select a successor deemed most capable of advancing their interests and ensuring the regime\u2019s stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Identifying potential successors is challenging, but pro-Russian hardliners\u2014such as associates of Deputy Interior Minister Mika\u0142aj Karpianko\u016d\u2014might face competition from technocrats within economic and diplomatic circles, e.g., D\u017amitryj Krutoj, head of the Belarusian leader\u2019s administration. These technocrats might advocate for modest reforms to improve relations with the West and lift international sanctions, demonstrating a willingness to engage in negotiations with the opposition to alleviate external pressure and stabilize the economy. If hardliners prevail, Belarus would remain heavily dependent on Russia, and civil society would continue to be suppressed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Managed transition<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

If \u0141uka\u0161enka resigned but retained control as chairman of the All-Belarusian People\u2019s Assembly, secretary of the Security Council, or leader of a ruling party, he would likely appoint a loyal successor\u2014someone unable to seize control of the security services. Observers suggest that, following the flawed power transition in Kazakhstan from Nursultan Nazarbayev, \u0141uka\u0161enka would be reluctant to experiment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a politician shaped by his career in the Soviet Union, \u0141uka\u0161enka likely sees Vladimir Lenin, Stalin, and Leonid Brezhnev as his role models, rather than Nazarbayev. Lenin and Brezhnev continued to govern even when physically unfit for the role, while Stalin maintained power until the end, despite intrigues within his circle and the risks of posthumous condemnation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since 2021, \u0141uka\u0161enka has been devising an exit strategy involving the All-Belarusian People\u2019s Assembly as a safeguard for himself and his family. The 2022 expansion of the assembly\u2019s powers is perceived as a step toward a long-term managed transition, although the timeline remains uncertain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In any case, a managed transition is a plausible scenario. The Belarusian ruler is likely to choose a loyal successor who is unable to dominate the security apparatus. The aim of such a managed transition would be to secure personal safety for \u0141uka\u0161enka and his family.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, death, retirement, and managed transitions do not ensure democratization. \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s departure is not inherently linked to a transition to democracy. Between 1945 and 1989, numerous leaders in the Soviet bloc retired, resigned or were dismissed, yet not a single departure triggered significant political change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Political transformation occurred between 1989 and 1991, despite all communist rulers maintaining their positions firmly. One should seek a game changer in different dimensions, rather than solely in the departure of an autocrat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nonetheless, the system will undergo considerable changes after \u0141uka\u0161enka departs, especially if he opts for a managed transition. It will no longer be the personalist system it has been since 1996, when he disbanded the Supreme Soviet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While \u0141uka\u0161enka concentrated power in one set of hands, his departure might lead to a distribution of power among multiple individuals or groups, with him serving as a sort of referee and guarantor of stability for his allies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Lukashenka on the stump as opposition mulls strategy<\/h3>\n
Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s re-election campaign is in full swing as he steps up informal visits to villages and small towns to give the campaign a more personal and down-to-earth feel. Meanwhile, his exiled opponents are still discussing their strategy for the …<\/div>\n \n