{"id":109276,"date":"2024-10-14T14:49:40","date_gmt":"2024-10-14T11:49:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/109276\/"},"modified":"2026-04-15T13:35:32","modified_gmt":"2026-04-15T13:35:32","slug":"drone-incursions-fuel-speculation-about-lukasenkas-future","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/109276\/","title":{"rendered":"Drone incursions fuel speculation about \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s future"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Despite occasional speculation about discord, the strong relationship between Putin and \u0141uka\u0161enka remains intact. Regular meetings and the recent award show that Moscow continues to support its Belarusian ally, especially in the context of the war in Ukraine.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n \"\"\n
\n
\n\n Putin presents \u0141uka\u0161enka with Russia\u2019s top award at the Kremlin on October 9\n <\/div>\n \n
\n (Screenshot: A video from the Pul Pervogo Telegram channel)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

On October 9, Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded the Order of St. Andrew the Apostle the First-Called to Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka at the Kremlin. As Belarus’ presidential election approaches, observers are questioning whether the Belarusian leader has Moscow\u2019s approval to serve for another term.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

No signs of discord<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Some Ukrainian commentators speculate that Putin may convince \u0141uka\u0161enka to step down in favor of a pro-Russian candidate willing to become more involved in the Russian war in Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conspiracy theorists argue that the recent incursions of Russian military drones into Belarus are a subtle message from Putin, urging \u0141uka\u0161enka to either join the war or stop making overtures to Kyiv and the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That theory seems far-fetched, considering that Putin has plenty of other ways to communicate directives to his ally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka has attributed the incursions to the poor skills of drone operators and the effects of electronic warfare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Putin has held eight meetings with \u0141uka\u0161enka this year, meaning they have had ample opportunity to discuss any matters of concern. Their most recent face-to-face meeting took place in July on the secluded Valaam Island and lasted for three days.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The regular communication and the conferral of the award suggest there is no discord between them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the past, when disagreements arose, Moscow would cut gas and oil supplies. However, it now provides substantial support, recognizing the value of the ally in wartime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dismantling Belarusian independence as a subtle alternative to annexation<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Some analysts believe that after the war in Ukraine, Moscow might reduce its support for Belarus. However, this seems unlikely. Russia is likely to continue backing its ally as it plans its next moves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is also speculation that Putin might annex Belarus as a “consolation prize” if his efforts in Ukraine fail. However, Russian troops are pushing hard in Donbas, and even a ceasefire along the current front line could be portrayed as a victory by Russian propaganda.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is not in the Kremlin\u2019s best interest to pressure its ally too much, as this could push other post-Soviet countries to distance themselves from Russia. Putin would prefer to gradually erode Belarusian sovereignty without drawing excessive attention to his actions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At one point during the 2020 protests, Moscow may have considered pushing for \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s ousting, believing that he was on the verge of collapse. However, the Belarusian leader managed to suppress the uprising and maintain power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Putin\u2019s priority has shifted. He now needs Belarus as a launchpad for his attack on Ukraine, and a transfer of power in Belarus is no longer a primary objective for Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka too smart to overlook Russian conspiracy<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

A year ago, opposition politician Pavie\u0142 \u0141atu\u0161ka claimed the Kremlin had a plan to replace \u0141uka\u0161enka. Allegedly, Moscow was preparing to back pro-Russian candidates in the 2024 parliamentary election, and then use the All-Belarusian People\u2019s Assembly to remove \u0141uka\u0161enka from power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the February election for the House of Representatives passed without incident. The Assembly showed no activity, and all candidates were thoroughly vetted by \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s administration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Though some pro-Russian politicians gained seats, \u0141uka\u0161enka remains firmly in control, and any such conspiracy would have been quickly suppressed by the security services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Kremlin cannot simply appoint someone to replace \u0141uka\u0161enka. At a minimum, it must simulate an election, and any candidate would have to meet the constitutional requirements: be a citizen by birth, have lived in the country for at least 20 years, and not hold foreign citizenship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Earlier, some observers speculated that Moscow might replace \u0141uka\u0161enka with Stanis\u0142a\u016d Za\u015b, secretary general of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, but he is ineligible due to his Ukrainian birth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A new president would be too risky for Russia<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Promoting a successor would take time, but so far, there is no visible push for a new figure. The election is scheduled for the first half of 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moscow has already failed to convince \u0141uka\u0161enka to send his army to Ukraine. It would likely find it even more difficult to persuade him to retire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In theory, the Kremlin could apply pressure by cutting off oil, gas, and financial flows, as it has done in the past. But during the war, it is not in Russia\u2019s best interest to alienate its ally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Assuming Moscow has identified a potential replacement for \u0141uka\u0161enka, the candidate would need to be registered by Ihar Karpienka, head of the Central Election Commission and a man highly loyal to \u0141uka\u0161enka.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Leadership is a matter of experience, and while \u0141uka\u0161enka can be tough, he is firmly in control. In fact, he is now the only significant politician in Belarus, while his officials simply carry out instructions and lack experience in governing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Putin is unlikely to risk destabilizing the country by installing an untested candidate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mika\u0142aj Karpianko\u016d, a former deputy interior minister once seen as a potential pro-Kremlin challenger, has disappeared from the public eye following criticism from \u0141uka\u0161enka.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite his unpredictable nature, \u0141uka\u0161enka generally aligns with Moscow’s wishes. There is little reason for Putin to replace him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Change inevitable, but unpredictable<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s future remains the subject of intense speculation because the public remains in the dark about what he and Putin discuss in private\u2014and whether he is physically fit to continue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So far, there has been no indication that \u0141uka\u0161enka is considering retirement. Based on his statements, it seems he plans to stay in power for at least five more years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n
\n \"\"